670. To manage that risk, the UK proposed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the US to establish procedures for working together on issues related to the
Occupation, but it could not be agreed. Having supplied the overwhelming majority of the
CPA’s resources, the US had little incentive to give the UK an influential role in deciding
how those resources were to be used, and the UK lacked the will and leverage to insist.
671. In the absence of formal arrangements, there was a clear risk that the UK would be inadequately involved in important decisions, and the UK struggled from the start to have a significant effect on the CPA’s policies. This was a source of concern to both Ministers and officials in 2003, but the issue was never resolved.
672. Senior individuals deployed to Iraq by the UK at this time saw themselves either as working for the CPA in support of its objectives and as part of its chain of command, or as UK representatives within the CPA with a remit to seek to influence CPA decisions. No‑one formally represented the UK position within the CPA decision‑making process, a serious weakness which should have been addressed at an early stage.
673. Managing a joint occupation of such size and complexity effectively and coherently required regular formal and informal discussion and clear decision‑making at all levels, both between capitals and in‑country. Once attempts to agree an MOU had failed, the chances of constructing such mechanisms were slim.
674. In the absence of an MOU with the US, the UK’s influence in Baghdad depended heavily on the personal impact of successive Special Representatives and British Ambassadors to Iraq and the relationships they were able to build with senior US figures.
675. Some instances of important CPA decisions in which the UK played little or no formal part were:
- The decision to issue CPA Order No.2, which “dissolved” (or disbanded) a number of military and other security entities that had operated as part of Saddam Hussein’s regime, including the armed forces (see Section 12). This was raised informally by Ambassador Bremer in his first meeting with Mr John Sawers, Mr Blair’s Special Representative on Iraq, who – unbriefed – did not at that point take a contrary position. The concept of creating a new army had also been raised by Mr Walt Slocombe, CPA Senior Adviser on National Security and Defense, in discussion with Mr Hoon. Dissolution was a key decision which was to have a significant effect on the alienation of the Sunni community and the development of an insurgency in Iraq, and the terms and timing of this important Order should have been approved by both Washington and London.
