- The level of female representation in Iraq’s new political structures, including the 25 percent “goal” for members of the National Assembly set by the Transitional Administrative Law, which the UK pursued with some success.
678. In the absence of decision‑making arrangements in which the UK had a formal role, too much reliance was placed on communication between Mr Blair and President Bush, one of the very small number of ways of influencing US policy. Some issues were addressed by this route: for instance, using his regular conversations with President Bush, Mr Blair was able, with some success, to urge caution in relation to the US operation in Fallujah in April 2004.
679. But the channel of communication between Prime Minister and President should be reserved for the most strategic and most intractable issues. It is not the right mechanism for day‑to‑day policy‑making or an effective way of making tactical decisions.
680. It is impossible to say whether a greater and more formal UK input to CPA decisions would have led to better outcomes. But it is clear that the UK’s ability to influence decisions made by the CPA was not commensurate with its responsibilities as joint Occupying Power.
A DECLINE IN SECURITY
681. From early June 2003, and throughout the summer, there were signs that security in both Baghdad and the South was deteriorating. The MOD’s SPG warned that “more organised opposition to the Coalition may be emerging”[1] as discontent about the Coalition’s failure to deliver a secure environment began to grow in the Iraqi population.
682. The extent of the decline in Baghdad and central Iraq overshadowed the decline in Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (MND(SE)). Food shortages and the failure of essential services such as the supply of electricity and water, plus lack of progress in the political process, however, began to erode the relationship between UK forces and the local population. The deterioration was exemplified by attacks on UK forces in Majar al‑Kabir in Maysan province on 22 and 24 June.
683. As the summer wore on, authoritative sources in the UK, such as the JIC, began to identify issues with the potential to escalate into conflict and to recognise the likelihood that extremist groups would become more co‑ordinated. The constraint imposed on reconstruction activities by the lack of security began to be apparent. Mr Sawers and Sir David Manning expressed concern about whether the UK had sufficient troops deployed in MND(SE), and about the permeability of Maysan’s substantial border with Iran.
- ↑ Minute SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 10 June 2003, ‘OP COS Paper: UK Contribution to Iraq: Strategic Intent and Direction’ attaching Paper SPG, 9 June 2003, ‘UK contribution to Iraq: strategic intent and direction’.
