692. There was a strong case for reinforcing MND(SE) so that it could handle its
high‑priority tasks (providing essential security for reconstruction projects, protecting
existing infrastructure, guarding key sites and improving border security to inhibit
the import of arms from Iran) effectively in changing circumstances. Those tasks all
demanded a higher level of manpower than was available. Although additional military
personnel were deployed in September 2003, mainly to fill existing gaps in support for
reconstruction activities, their numbers were far too small to have a significant impact.
693. The failure to consider the option of reinforcement at this time was a serious omission and Lt Gen Reith and Gen Walker should have ensured that UK force levels in MND(SE) were formally reconsidered in autumn 2003 or at the latest by the end of the year. Increases in UK force levels in order to address the security situation should have been recommended to Ministers. Any opportunity to regain the initiative and pre‑empt further deterioration in the security situation was lost.
694. In October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander Combined Joint Task Force‑7, had “come to recognise that Coalition operations are at a standstill and that there is a need to regain momentum”.[1] Doubts started to build about the chances of credible elections based on a legitimate constitution in the course of 2004 and work began to look for alternatives to the plan set out by Ambassador Bremer. The “bloodiest 48‑hour period in Baghdad since March”,[2] including an attack on the al‑Rashid Hotel in Baghdad’s Green Zone, was sufficient to convince some that a pivotal point in the security situation had been reached.
695. When President Bush visited London in November, Mr Blair provided him with a paper written by Sir Jeremy Greenstock which argued that security should be the highest priority in the run‑up to June 2004, when the Iraqi Transitional Government would take power. Sir Jeremy suggested that troop levels should be looked at again and highlighted “the dangers we face if we do not get a grip on the security situation” as a topic that President Bush and Mr Blair needed to discuss in stark terms.
696. The constraints within which the UK was operating as a result of the limited scale of forces deployed in Iraq were articulated clearly for the Chiefs of Staff in December. Lt Gen Fry argued that a strategy of “early effect”[3] was needed which prioritised campaign success. Operation TELIC was the UK “Main Effort”, but deploying additional resources in a way that was compliant with the Defence Planning Assumptions would require the withdrawal of resources from other operations.
697. On 1 January 2004, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote bluntly: “This theatre remains a security crisis.”[4]
- ↑ Telegram 230 IraqRep to FCO London, 24 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Security Update’.
- ↑ Telegram 1426 Washington to FCO London, 28 October 2003, ‘Iraq: US Views 28 October’.
- ↑ Minute DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 5 December 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Review of UK Military Strategy for Iraq’.
- ↑ Telegram 337 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Six Final Months of Occupation’.
