the defenders a position most dangerous for the rest of Paris, which the heights entirely dominated, particularly the richer quarters. From the disasters which everywhere marked the retreat of the Federals, it is not to be doubted that, had they remained in possession of the heights, the portion of the city lying on the right bank of the Seine would have been one mass of ruins.
This bombardment was foreseen, and had excited most cruel apprehensions in the central quarters. If it did not take place, no honor is due to the conscientious scruples of the chiefs of the Commune, who have sufficiently proved their utter want of any feelings of humanity. This important success was chiefly due to the divisions, uncertainty and divergency of action, which were manifest in all the military operations of the Commune, and also to the sudden entry of the army into Paris, it being expected that the troops would be kept in check a long time at the ramparts.
Montmartre taken, and the quarters below it occupied, the barricades of the exterior boulevard retained little power of resistance. That of the Place Blanche, attacked by the Rue Vintimille and the boulevard, was abandoned as soon as its defenders recognized the regular troops in the interior of Montmartre. They retreated to the Place Pigalle, where a desperate struggle took place, lasting three hours, at the end of which time the troops became masters of the barricade.
When the army had thus taken Montmartre and several other important points of the same zone, it remained necessary to gain possession of Belleville, Père-Lachaise, the Buttes Chaumont, and Menilmontant. To invest these points, which were all strongly occupied by the insurgents, it was necessary first to take the Boulevard Magenta, and next the Place du Chateau-d'Eau, a strategic position of first importance, commanding, as it
