PHILOSOPHICAL BIOLOGY 457
Biology and logic^ as understood in this discussion, have very much in common in that biology can do nothing with the natural objects which are its subject matter except through the instrumentality of a great lot of names; while logic can do nothing really significant with names of ideas concerning living beings unless those ideas have their exact coun- terparts in the objects themselyes.
To be explicit, we shall deal with the description, definition and classification of man; but instead of doing this in the usual terminology of the systematist, we shall talk about the meaning of the word " man."
Imagine a normal child born on an oceanic island, the only animal inhabitants of which are its mother and itself; and imagine further that the mother, an educated woman, has taught her child all sorts of things, except about other human beings or other animals. Not the smallest fragment of information has she imparted to the child about its own kind, other than its mother. What would be the character of the child's knowledge of the humankind? Does any one question that it would be considerable, definite and real ? Would not the child know its mother's form and countenance and voice, and many other things about her, just as well as though it knew innumerable other people? Unquestionably. It would have a descriptive, but no definitive knowledge of man, except in so far as the knowledge of itself would be differentiated from its knowledge of its mother.
Authorities on logic make a good deal of the point that the con- crete individual object can be described, but not defined." And they say, furthermore, that description is synonymous with " accidental defini- tion," this latter being again defined as assigning the ^^ accidents" of an individual. But since the '^ accidents" of an object have been, according to much historical logic, set over against its '^ essence," '^ acci- dents" have usually been treated by logic as a sort of Cinderella, the homely, despised sister, in the family of so-called Predicables.
I find justification for going thus much into logical doctrine in the fact that recent biology has shown a strong tendency to follow formal logic in exalting essence and despising accidents.
The practical point to be brought out is this : no matter how insig- nificant, or obscure, or transitory, may be a certain attribute of an object, in so far as that attribute is positively and repeatedly observed, it furnishes just as trustworthy a piece of knowledge about that object, as any attribute whatever can furnish.
Suppose the mother of our hypothetical island child had a mole on her chin; or that the sunshine brought out freckles on her nose which disappeared again during the winter. These marks would be accidents, according to logic; and biologically regarded would be quite insignifi- cant. But they would be as indubitable elements in the child's knowl- edge of its mother as any other elements that can be mentioned.
�� �
