78
THE SUPREME COURT
The first question that arose was independent of the main question, viz., whether it was part of the duty of the Attorney General of the United States to superintend the decisions of the inferior courts, and if to him they appeared improper to move the Supreme Court for a revision. After some prefatory remarks the Attorney General was asked from the bench whether he conceived it to be an official right to offer such a motion as he had intimated it to be. He answered that he did conceive it to be an official right. Upon which several observations were made and the debate continued from day to day until Saturday last. In favor of the Attorney General's exercising this power, the following are the heads of the principal arguments insisted on—the analogy between the nature of that office here and in England,—that part of the Judiciary Act which gives the Attorney General a superintendence over the concerns of the United States in the Courts of Justice which, giving latitude to the word concern brought the case within the power granted by the law,—and the Attorney General being the only officer of the Supreme Executive to whom the Constitution gives a superintendence over the execution of all the laws of the Union. Against this opinion, it was allied that the analogy drawn was not sound, but rather dangerous; that the latitude given to the word concern would tend to give that officer a right officially to interfere in any law controversy between citizens, as the United States were concerned in seeing justice done in every case,—and that as the act of the Attorney General was not within his ordinary duty, it would require special authority from the Supreme Executive to establish its propriety. These were the principal heads of the argument used. The discussion was full and the Bench divided on the question. Judges Iredell, Johnson and Blair, declaring in favor of the Attorney General and Judges Wilson, Cushing and the Chief Justice entertaining the contrary opinion. This equal division was sufficient to reject the mode of proceeding Mr. Randolph first adopted, who then started on another ground, as counsel for a petitioner who had been unsuccessful in an application to the District Court of Pennsylvania. His motion, after being accompanied with the reasons which induced him to believe the
