ing feature of the first century of its existence should
be noted—that the chief conflicts arose over the Court's
decisions restricting the limits of State authority and
not over those restricting the limits of Congressional
power. Discontent with its decisions on the latter
subject arose, not because the Court held an Act of
Congress unconstitutional, but rather because it refused to do so; the Anti-Federalists and the early
Republicans assailed the Court because it failed to
hold the Sedition Law, the Bank of the United States
charter and the Judiciary Act unconstitutional; the
Democrats later attacked the Court for announcing doctrines which would sustain the constitutionality of
an Internal Improvement bill, a voluntary Bankruptcy
bill, a Protective Tariff bill and similar measures obnoxious to them; the Federalists equally attacked the
Court for refusing to hold unconstitutional the Embargo Act, and the later Republicans assailed it for
sustaining the Fugitive Slave Act. It was in respect
to its exercise of a restraining power over the States
that the Court met with its chief opposition. That the
Federal Judiciary would of necessity be the focus of attack in all important controversies between the States
and the Nation was fully recognized by the framers
of the Constitution, but it was the essential pivot of
their whole plan.[1] The success of the new Government depended on the existence of a supreme tribunal,
free from local political bias or prejudice, vested with
power to give an interpretation to Federal laws and
treaties which should be uniform throughout the land,
- ↑ Rufus King wrote to Jonathan Jackson, Sept. 3, 1786: "Mr. Madison of Virginia has been here for some time past; he will attend the Convention. He does not discover or propose any other plan than that of investing Congress with full powers for the regulation of commerce foreign and domestic. But this power win run deep into the authorities of the individual States, and can never be well exercised without a Federal Judicial." Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. (1915-16), XLIX.