of the Court, in the one hundred and twenty years
which have since elapsed.[1] "It is not for Judges
to listen to the voice of persuasive eloquence or popular appeal," said Judge Story in the Dartmouth College
Case. "We have nothing to do but pronounce the
law as we find it, and having done this, our justification must be left to the impartial judgment of
our country."[2] Loose statements by some modern
writers on law and sociology to the effect that the
"Bench has always had an avowed partisan bias",
are not sustained on examination of its history.[3] Thus,
Judges appointed by Jefferson and Madison did not
hesitate to join with Marshall in sustaining and developing the strongly Nationalistic interpretation of the
Constitution so obnoxious to Jefferson. Judges appointed by Jackson joined with Marshall and Story
- ↑ Connecticut Courant, Feb. 9, 16, 1801, account of a dinner to Oliver Wolcott in Washington, Jan. 24, 1801.
- ↑ Paterson, J., in Fowler v. Lindsay (1799), 3 Dallas, 411: “No prejudice or passion, whether of a State or personal nature, should insinuate itself in the administration of justice. . . It is the duty of Judges to declare, and not to make, the law." Moody, J., in Twining v. New Jersey (1908), 211 U. S. 106: "Under the guise of interpreting the Constitution, we must take care that we do not import into the discussion our personal views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be adopted by a free people, and confound them with constitutional limitations."
- ↑ Brooks Adams in The Theory of Social Revolutions (1913), 47, says: “In fine, from the outset, the American bench, because it deals with the most fiercely contested of political issues, has been an instrument necessary to political success. Consequently, political parties have striven to control it, and therefore the bench has always had an avowed partisan bias." See in answer to this, Judicial Interpretation of Political Theory; A Study in the Relation of Courts to the American Party System (1914), by William B. Bizzell; Is Law the Expression of Class Selfishness, by Francis M. Burdick, Harv. Law Rev. (1912), XXV; see also Politics and the Supreme Court, by Walter D. Coles, Amer. Law Rev. (1898), XXVII. Westel W. Willoughby, op. cit., 99, answering Von Holst's charge in his Constitutional History of the United States that their views on slavery controlled the appointment of Judges prior to 1860, says: "That the judiciary committee (of the Senate) was, for some years, influenced in its action regarding nominations to the Supreme Court by the views of the nominees as to slavery is extremely probable. . . . That, however, the Justices acted in accordance with their conscientious interpretation of the Constitution, a study of the character of the Justices, of the history of the cases, and of the several decisions rendered must, I think, convince the impartial."
