with the responsibility of correcting every possible
abuse arising from the exercise by the other departments of their conceded authority. So to hold would
be to overthrow the entire distinction between the
Legislative, Judicial and Executive departments of the
Government, upon which our system is founded, and
would be a mere act of judicial usurpation. . . . The
decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no sup-
port whatever to the assumption that the Judiciary
may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused
the power to be exerted." "If it be said that a statute
like the one before us is mischievous in its tendencies,
the answer is that the responsibility therefor rests
upon legislators, not upon the Courts," said Judge Harlan. "No evils arising from such legislation could
be more far-reaching than those that might come to
our system of government, if the Judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by the fundamental law,
should enter the domain of legislation, and, upon grounds
merely of justice or reason or wisdom, annul statutes
that had received the sanction of the people's representatives."[1]
While, as thus outlined, the Court has won the general confidence of the people, it may fairly be admitted that criticism has not been entirely dissipated, and that temporary resentment over decisions running athwart the opinions of certain classes or sections of the country leads from time to time to demands for changes in the Judiciary system. It has been contended, and with a certain amount of reason, that the Court should impose a further voluntary limitation on its power, by announcing that it would decline to regard the
- ↑ McCray v. United States (1904), 195 U. S. 27, 54; Atkin v. Kansas (1903), 191 U. S. 207, 223.
