Adhik. I. Snt. /.] SRI-BHASHYA. it
How, then, is the knowledge of works, which depends upon distinctions, of any use to such a person ? On the contrary it is positively unfavourable (to him). Moreover, the dis- cussion of the Udgitha, &c., really forms a part of (the study of) works ; and yet as it (viz. that discussion) is closely allied to what constitutes knowledge, it is also (incidentally) con- ducted here (in the Vcdn>ita). Indeed, it (/. c. the conduct of that discussion here) is i.ot due to any direct relationship (of antecedence and sequence). Hence, whatever is desidera- ted by what forms the principal subject of this science --that very thing has to be mentioned as its antecedent. (The Bhd- skarlyas may, however, here interpose and say) " True ; but the knowledge of works alone is what is desiderated by it, because it is declared that final release (or moksha) re- sults from knowledge that is added to works. He (the Sfitra-kdrd) also says : ' There is need of all (works), be- cause there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices, &c.; just as (the harness is needed) in the case of the horse.' [ Ved, Snt. III. 4. 26.]. Moreover, when the desi- derate works are not (themselves-) made out, it is not possible to know the distinction, as to with which (of them) there is to be the cumulative association (of knowledge and as to with which it is not to be. Hence that (viz. karma) alone is the antecedent (subject of enquiry)." This view (we mention) is not proper, because the cessation of ignorance (or oiavidyd) is due solely to the knowledge of the Brahman, who is pure intelligence and hostile to all characterising attributes. In reality, final re.ei.se is merely the cessation of ignorance. How can works which are subject to endless distinctions arising from the peculiarities due to tiie various conditions ana stages of iLe, (arising) from the ojjects which these have in view and from the means of accomplishing them, as also Irom the man her of
