the individual selves and the Supreme Self is further confirmed by references to Upanishadic passages and to aphorisms in the Veddnta-Sntras (pp. 144-148.) At last the question of what the sastras say regarding the nature of the individual self in the beatific condition of final freedom from all association with matter is discussed clearly, and it is established that in that condition the released individual self does not become identical in essence with the Supreme Self, but that it only acquires most of the auspicious and divine qualities of the Supreme Self ; and it is shewn that the Brahman whom the individual self is said to attain in the state of moksha is not mere attributeless intelligence, that, on the contrary, He is full of goodness, power, and glory, and that the individual self becomes one with Him then for the reason that he attains the highest degree of equality with Him and is free from the bondage of karma (pp. 148-156.).
Now begins the criticism of that theory of the Adwaitins according to which a beginninglessly old ' ignorance ' known as avidya or mdyd is held to be at the root of our perception of the differentiated phenomenal world, and according to which also such an avidya has necessarily to be admitted on the authority of the scripture and has to be understood to be a certain something which is neither a positive entity nor a negative non-entity. Seven difficulties are pointed out to be in the way of this theory being true. The first of these is called Asray&nupapatti, and deals with the difficulty of finding something for this ' ignorance ' to reside in. In as much as the self-hood of the individual self is itself projected by avidya, it is argued that this avidya cannot reside in the individual self and thus give rise to the illusion for which it is held to be responsible. And in as much as the Brahman has the essential
