protect emigrants and traders on the Oregon route, were created (May 15 and 19); and numerous details concerning organization were either prescribed or entrusted to the Executive (June 18 and 26)[1] Under the last head authority was given to appoint all the necessary general officers.[2] Meantime (May 13) the President issued a war proclamation, modelled upon that of 1812, in which he announced that an appeal had been made to "the last resort of injured nations"; and the state department (May 14) sent a confidential circular to our agents abroad, explaining that we had taken up arms reluctantly, and "solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace."[3]
"The war sense of the United States," it has been remarked, "seems to be in inverse ratio to its war spirit;" and in general the military measures of the government exhibited more zeal than discretion. In particular they put into action the very system that had proved disastrous a generation before For this Taylor was primarily responsible, for after having seen the war of 1812 and that of Florida languish and crawl, he strongly urged that volunteers be called out for one year of Service. Polk's Message deepened the mischief by expressing confidence in raw troops, although in 1838 the secretary of war had assured him that the difference in expense between volunteers and regulars was "at least as four to one," besides the waste resulting from their total ignorance of administration, the cost of marching to and from distant points for short periods of service, and the disproportionate growth of the pension list.[4] The President was indeed authorized to increase the number of privates in a regular company, but the roll of officers remained as before; and enlistment was not stimulated, as it might have been, by adding something to the pay.[5]
Having a choice between a definite and an indefinite period, the volunteers were sure, as Marcy foresaw, to elect the former, although e as the sequel appeared to show — a sufficient number would almost certainly have engaged for the war, had that been the only proposal, The Mexicans were commonly regarded as cowardly and inefficient. Very few Americans expected them to hold out as long as they did; and intending Volunteers would naturally have counted, therefore, upon returning soon. There were also the enthusiastic feelings
