Page:The War with Mexico, Vol 1.djvu/433

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NOTES ON PREFACE, PAGES vii-ix

3. The printed versions of diplomatic and military documents, when substantially correct, are usually cited in the notes, because they are easily accessible; but so far as possible they have been collated with the originals. On the value of official military reports the author presented some remarks in the American Historical Review, vol. xxi, p. 96. Gen. Worth said privately that Scott's report on the battle of Cerro Gordo was "a lie from beginning to end," and in a sense different from what this language would at first sight appear to mean, it was fairly correct (chap. xxiii, note 33). Subordinate officers not infrequently brought all possible influence, both personal and political, to bear upon the general whose report they knew would be printed. A general naturally favored in his report the regiment and the officers with whom he had been formerly associated. An undue regard for rank was often felt. Taylor asked a promotion for Brig Gen. Twiggs after the capture of Monterey though Twiggs had been ostensibly ill at the time and had taken no material part in the fight. Captain (later General) Bragg wrote: 'The feelings succeeding a great victory caused many things to be forgotten and forgiven which would sound badly in history, and which will never be known except in private correspondence" (210to Gov. Hammond, May 4, 1848). An important document issued by our government was privately described by the adj. gen. as "full of inaccuracies" (117R. Jones to B. Mayer, Oct. 10, 1848).


A special reason for leaving no stone unturned has been the consideration that the omission of a significant fact is even worse than a positive error, since it is equally misleading and less likely to be discovered. In many instances an apparently insignificant document proved to be the keystone of an arch or at least to fill a serious gap, and the cumulative effect of a number of such documents frequently established a capital fact. Documents not actually used often prove helpful by preventing the writer from drawing inferences that look reasonable but are in fact incorrect (see the last paragraph of the article in the Military Historian cited above). Even minutæ enable one to give life and, so to speak, rotundity to events, and to do this is to increase the fidelity of the narrative. The more information the historian possesses, the better he can criticise particular documents. In consequence of a want of this full acquaintance with the facts, documents relating to the subject have previously been misunderstood. Still another valuable fruit of a wide investigation is a higher degree of confidence on the part of both author and reader that no later discoveries will upset present conclusions. For Scott's statement see 65gen. orders 249, Aug. 6, 1847.


Naturally the author had little occasion to use previous histories of the war, and indeed he took care not to consult them while writing this work. No thorough attempt has been made to point out their errors and no wish is felt to criticize them in general; but it needs to be explained that while Ripley, Wilcox, Furber and Roa Bárcena present statements of minor importance, not found elsewhere, which the author wished to use, he has seldom felt at liberty to do so. As is well known those authors were not critical historians. They were also too near the events. It is frequently impossible to be sure whether their statements rested upon hearsay, upon trustworthy second-hand information, or upon personal knowledge. Roa Bárcena spoke as a Mexican. Wilcox aimed to glorify our officers and men; and Ripley intended to exalt the unworthy Pillow at the expense of Scott (chap. xxiii, note 29; and, for an interesting though