point was to respect Mexico's territory; by the right of occupation, at least, her territory extended to the well-known Sabine River; the United States forces were therefore bound under all circumstances to remain east of that stream, and should some of our citizens be robbed and murdered, we could call upon Mexico to pay compensation and protect the rest; after almost endless evasions it would appear that she had no power to fulfill her treaty obligations, and therefore, since that fact was known to all the world, she should not be expected to comply with our wishes; and then, should we please, we could declare war. In other words, for the sake, at most, of a technicality, they would have had us quietly see irreparable injuries done that we could have prevented and had known Mexico could not prevent, and then do irreparable injuries ourselves to punish her for her involuntary helplessness.
As for the evidence of danger (which Gaines was instructed to examine carefully), Gorostiza declared it was fabricated in order to excuse the crossing of the boundary and get American troops into Texas — thus giving the rebels at least the moral support of their presence and infringing upon the rights of Mexico (Pakenham, no. 94, 1836; Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 20; Gor., Correspondencia, xxvii), and he protested that his country was incapable of stirring up the savages against our border (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 84; 77Gor. to Relaciones, Oct. 4). But there is not the slightest sign that he made the difficult and extended investigation requisite as a basis for denying the testimony presented to Gaines, whereas he was capable of asserting, more than a month after the battle of San Jacinto, that the news of it was "entirely destitute of authenticity," and stating that he had "reasons for believing it to have been expressly forged in Texas" or at least to have been exaggerated "'to the very confines of the ridiculous" (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 33). His contention was therefore valueless, and almost equally so was that of certain Americans, against the evidence of danger. One such opinion, however, is entitled to notice. It came from the governor of Louisiana (Macomb: Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 55). But (1) the governor, who was far from the scene, merely expressed a view unsupported by evidence; (2) there may have been good reasons why he did not wish to have citizens of Louisiana called out, as Gaines proposed, to do arduous and perhaps perilous military service; and (3) it may have seemed undesirable to have the American army, which made a good market in the western part of the state, move to Nacogdoches and obtain supplies there. Gaines appears really to have had adequate grounds for crossing the Sabine. A letter from the Texas secretary of state to the President of Texas (Tex. Dipl. Corr, i, 84), which no one can imagine was "'fabricated," shows that Gaines insisted upon having the facts, and that strong evidence was presented to him (see also Bee in Sen. 14; 32, 2, p. 53). May 5, 1836, the National Intelligencer printed a letter dated April 20, which stated that the writer heard, when about six miles from Nacogdoches, that the Indians were coming, felt satisfied the news was correct, and saw the people fleeing in the utmost alarm. It was deemed necessary to divert some of the few Texan troops, desperately needed at the front, in order to ward off the danger from Indians (Brown, Texas, ii, 89, 90). The governor of Arkansas called out forces to protect the frontier (N. Orl. Courier, Sept. 27, 1836). The other evidence cited above in the references, when taken together and fairly weighed in view of the circumstances, has also a very substantial value. The part of it most doubted, probably, is that referring to a Mexican agent engaged in rousing the Indians against