not the rejection of Slidell but our grievances, and his diary shows that he believed this ground would be accepted by Congress, or at least believed so to such an extent as to decide upon raising the issue squarely.]
In October, 1847, the Review stated the policy which it said Polk should have adopted: to issue a statement that we would defend Texas, that Mexico must pay the claims of our citizens, and that we desired no Mexican territory; next, to take a defensive position in Texas, perhaps occupy a Pacific port as security for our claims, and then await developments. [As a military programme this plan of standing on the defensive was seriously considered by the government and, as we shall see, was condemned for both political and military reasons. To say we desired no Mexican territory would have been meaningless unless we pledged ourselves to take none, and to issue suck a promise on the eve of a war the course of which could not be predicted, and especially in view of the fact that Mexico could pay no large indemnity except with territory, would certainly have been imprudent, and the Review's proposition to seize a port as security for our claims suggests as much. This proposition, by the way, was less justifiable than going to the Rio Grande, for we had a claim to the intermediate territory and no claim to a Mexican port. To take a defensive attitude in Texas signified either going to the Rio Grande in order to obtain a good strategic position, or maintaining at great expense for an indefinite period an army large enough to guarantee the Texans against attack at any and every point. 'he first of these plans was the one adopted by Polk; the second, on account of the expense, would have been unjust to our own people, and in the end would have compelled us to increase our demands for indemnity against Mexico. Moreover, there were strong objections to waiting (p. 136); and, had Mexico simply adhered to the policy of passive resistance, all our trouble and expense would have brought us no nearer a settlement. Still other objections to the plan of the Review could be offered.]
VIII. PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA
1, The account of the Mexican army is based upon Memorias de. . . Guerra, 1844; Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846; 152Claiborne, Mems.; Diario, May 30, 1845; Balbontin, Estado Militar; Paz, Invasién; 5Anaya, Memoria; Peña, Comunicación circular; Siglo XIX, Aug. 19, 21, 1845; 8. Miguel, Repúb. Mex., 133-4, 136; Wash. Globe, Oct. 15, 1845; Molina, recolls.; Hist. Mag., Feb., 1870 (Deas); Zirckel, Tagebuch, 13, 111; Semmes, Service, 441, note; 75Memorias drawn up by war dept. chiefs, Nov., 1847; 81Seminario Polit. del Gob. de N. León; Moore, Scott's Camp., 19; 76Report of superior engineer board, Nov. 15, 1845; Balbontín, Invasión, 77-8; Monitor Repub., Nov. 30, 1847; 148Chamberlain, recolls.; 69 eport of spy, Apr. 5, 1846; N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, May 21, 1846; 76Carrera, report on artillery, Dec., 1847; 76reports of the powder mills at Zacatecas and Santa Fé.
Dec., 1843, a special school of application for artillery and engineer officers was decreed, but lack of money prevented its establishment. There was a normal school, intended to convey the rudiments of military knowledge to the privates through the corporals and sergeants, but it signified little or nothing. Attached to the engineer corps was a body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers; but, owing to lack of funds to equip it with, it served as infantry. The poorest cannon, especially at first, were kept at