probable, but Scott made no plans, collected no information, and did nothing to prepare for the coming strain upon the head-quarters organization of the army." But (1) war was not deemed highly probable, as Rives states, by the President, the Cabinet, Congress, Wall Street, Taylor or competent observers in general (see p. 133, etc.); (2) it is a rather bold assertion that Scott "did nothing to prepare," etc., and the present author, who intended to examine every war dept. paper relating to the subject, saw no proof of it; (3) as Rives states (ii, 582), the army had no intelligence bureau, and Scott possessed no authority to establish one; (4) to collect reliable data regarding Mexico and our frontier even informally would have cost a great deal, and the government was so economical that it would not provide even a pontoon train that was asked for (see p. 177); (5) before Jan. 13, 1846, Scott had studied the frontier and planned for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande (p. 153); (6) May 14 he was ready with plans so elaborate and far-reaching that Polk thought him "scientific and visionary," and the next day he issued orders to the chiefs of the general staff (p. 199). Such plans and orders implied knowledge.
31. May 30, Taylor was brevetted major general and assigned to duty with that rank (Ho. 119; 29, 2, p.12. Also Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283).
32. Anti-slavery theorizers represented (see Lalor, Cyclopædia, iii, 1091) that Polk brought the Oregon issue to the verge of war so that Mexico should dare — with the expectation of having England for an ally — to fight us, and when hostilities had begun, made peace with England at a sacrifice of our claim; but this view has little or nothing except its ingenuity for support, and has a great number of facts against it.
33. The Oregon affair. 206J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 4, 1846. Dr. Bacon: "The ascendancy of the West is a fact" (New Englander, v, 319). (Cass) 1 to Allen, Sept. 1, 1846. 210Hammond, diary, Feb. 19. Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 653, 697-8. Polk, Diary, Oct. 21-8, 1845; Feb. 24-5; Apr. 18; June 3, 1846. Lodge, Webster, 260. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Apr. 30, 1845. Johnson, Douglas, 105. (Cabinet) 354Welles papers. A. Smith, Remins., 41. Garrison, Extension, 170. Polit. Sci. Qtrly., xxvi, 443-61 (Schuyler). Amer. Hist. Rev., xvi, 298-9 (Schafer). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 243-64. London Times, Jan. 26, 1846. Hume in Ho. Commons, Jan. 23.
34. For Santa Anna's banishment see vol. i, p. 53. In May it was believed at Mexico that Santa Anna's return would mean peace (56W. S. Parrott, June 4, 9); and as late as July 31 and August 12 166Pommarès, a secret agent of Conner at Vera Cruz, said that such was the prevalent opinion there.
35. Atocha, Statement. Nat. Intelligencer, June 10, 1845. 13Bankhead, no. 41, 1846. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 444, res., 1847. Monitor Repub., Feb. 16, 1847.
36. Apparently Conner was to obey this order or not as the circumstances of the moment should render expedient. Consul Campbell of Havana was directed in June to write often to Conner and express his opinion on the propriety of allowing Santa Anna to enter Mexico (166to Conner, July 9); at the time Santa Anna sailed for Vera Cruz Campbell wrote (166Aug. 7) to Conner arguing that he should be permitted to land; and Conner, in a 162letter to his wife (Aug. 19), explained why he had thought it best to let him pass. The Journal des Débats (Oct. 6, 1846) believed that the American government had reason to count upon Santa Anna's intentions though not upon his word; this was no doubt Polk's view.