All the arguments put forth in Taylor's despatches to the government were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army, which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss, to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without letting the truth be known.
A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor's course in this matter was not due to an expectation that Wool's column (chap. xiii) would render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed 'no element" in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact, since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately — and one can easily believe him — that only Taylor's popularity saved him from removal at this time (169to Crittenden, Oct. 19).
When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were sufficient for "not more" than ten days; but Worth had written privately on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that the army had provisions then for only about ten days (364to S.). According to the Washington correspondent of the Boston Atlas (Feb. 8, 1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely have arrived in time (Littell's Living Age, no. 141, p. 191). Col. Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded, rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this purpose (73Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning of Sept. 21 Taylor's supply of ammunition was very limited and the supply of provisions still more so (139to D. C., Nov. 2).
The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later 487: Ho. 24; 31, 1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut. Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted in Niles, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was "generally supposed" at. Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7). Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, who was on the ground, wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans) were killed or mortally wounded. Haile, 2 trustworthy correspondent of the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter in Niles, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the same