Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/366

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238
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.
Book II.

compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race toward their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that con ceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in his instructions to the king, his son, "that fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed, she is the farther off." But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely, that same "Primum quærite." For divinity saith, "Primum quærite regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis:" and philosophy saith, "Primum quærite bona animi, cætera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt." And although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech,

"Te colui, virtus, ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;"

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

Concerning Government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired, in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:

"Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet."

Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion: the government of the soul in moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity, (the shadows whereof are in the poets,) in the description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars: neertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

But, contrariwise, in the governors toward the governed, all things ought, as far as the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as crystal: "Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo." So unto princes and states, especially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, "that there was one that knew how to hold his peace."

Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is Laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light, because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be law: for the wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams: and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of meum and tuum have into the public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles, or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the administration, and, as I may term it, animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I