Page:The Works of John Locke - 1823 - vol 01.djvu/191

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Ch. 7.
Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.
115

the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.

Pleasure and pain.§ 6. Though what I have here said may not perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries; the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings.

Existence and unity.§ 7. Existence and unity are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without, and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have existence; and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity.

Power.§ 8. Power also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection. For observing in ourselves, that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest, the effects also that natural bodies are able to produce in one another occurring every moment to our senses, we both these ways get the idea of power.

Succession.§ 9. Besides these there is another idea, which, though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered to us by what passes in our minds; and that is the idea of succession. For if we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought,