Thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immoveable, and without resistance to the motion of body.
The definition of extension explains it not.§ 15. If any one ask me what this space I speak of is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only that extension is extension: for what am I the better informed in the nature of extension when I am told, that extension is to have parts that are extended exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts? As if one asking what a fibre was? I should answer him, that it was a thing made up of several fibres: would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?
Division of beings into bodies and spirits proves not space and body the same.§ 16. Those who contend that space and body are the same, bring this dilemma: either this space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask whether it be body or spirit? To which I answer by another question, who told them that there was or could be nothing but solid beings which could not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and spirit.
Substance which we know not, no proof against space without body.§ 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space, void of body, be substance or accident, I shall readily answer, I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance.
