CONTENTS
OF
VOLUME I.
| BOOK I. | ||
| OF INNATE NOTIONS. | ||
| CHAPTER I. | ||
| THE INTRODUCTION. | ||
| SECT. | ||
| 1. | An inquiry into the understanding pleasant and useful. | |
| 2. | Design. | |
| 3. | Method. | |
| 4. | Useful to know the extent of our comprehension. | |
| 5. | Our capacity proportioned to our state and concerns, to discover things useful to us. | |
| 6. | Knowing the extent of our capacities will hinder us from useless curiosity, scepticism, and idleness. | |
| 7. | Occasion of this Essay. | |
| 8. | What idea stands for. | |
| CHAPTER II. | ||
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND, AND PARTICULARLY NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES. | ||
| SECT. | ||
| 1. | The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. | |
| 2. | General assent, the great argument. | |
| 3. | Universal consent proves nothing innate. | |
| 4. | What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; not universally assented to. | |
| 5. | Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. | |
| 6, 7. | That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. | |
| 8. | If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. | |
| 9—11. | It is false that reason discovers them. | |
| 12. | The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these maxims. | |
| 13. | By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. | |
| 14. | If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate. | |
