far exceeds all others at this time on the earth; to which the present establishment of the church does so happily agree, that I think, whoever is an enemy to either, must of necessity be so to both.
He thinks as our monarchy is constituted, an hereditary right, is much to be preferred before election. Because the government here, especially by some late amendments, is so regularly disposed in all its parts, that it almost executes itself. And therefore, upon the death of a prince among us, the administration goes on without any rub or interruption. For the same reasons, we have less to apprehend from the weakness or fury of our monarchs, who have such wise councils to guide the first, and laws to restrain the other. And therefore this hereditary right should be kept so sacred, as never to break the succession, unless where the preserving of it may endanger the constitution; which is not from any intrinsick merit, or unalienable right in a particular family, but to avoid the consequences that usually attend the ambition of competitors, to which elective kingdoms are exposed; and which is the only obstacle, to hinder them from arriving at the greatest perfection, that government can possibly reach. Hence appears the absurdity of that distinction, between a king de facto, and one de jure, with respect to us. For every limited monarch is a king de jure, because he governs by the consent of the whole, which is authority sufficient to abolish all precedent right. If a king come in by conquest, he is no longer a limited monarch; if he afterward consent to limitations, he becomes immediately king de jure, for the same reason.
