negotiators at the treaty of Gertruydenburg, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience in endeavouring to work the French up to their demands; but say nothing to justify those demands, or the probability that France would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were so extravagant, that in all human probability we could not have obtained them by a successful war of forty years. One of them was inconsistent with common reason; wherein the confederates reserved to themselves full liberty of demanding what farther conditions they should think fit; and in the mean time France was to deliver up several of their strongest towns in a month. These articles were very gravely signed by our plenipotentiaries, and those of Holland; but not by the French, although it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over by the secretary of the embassy; and the ministers here prevailed on the queen to execute a ratification of articles, which only one part had signed. This was an absurdity in form as well as in reason; because the usual form of a ratification is with a preamble, showing, that whereas our ministers, and those of the allies, and of the enemy, have signed, &c. we ratify, &c. The person[1] who brought over the articles said in all companies (and perhaps believed) that it was a pity we had not demanded more; for the French were in a disposition to refuse us nothing we would ask. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the same concern; and particularly that we had not obtained some farther security for the empire on the Upper Rhine.
- ↑ Horatio Walpole, secretary to that embassy.
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