have already observed) to add over and above a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a year. We know likewise, that a great part of the revenue of the Spanish Netherlands is already pawned to the States; so that, after a peace, nothing will be left to the sovereign, nor will the people be much eased of the taxes they at present labour under.
Thus the States, by virtue of this barrier treaty, will, in effect, be absolute sovereigns of all Flanders, and of the whole revenues in the utmost extent.
And here I cannot without some contempt take notice of a sort of reasoning offered by several people; that the many towns we have taken for the Dutch are of no advantage, because the whole revenue of those towns are spent in maintaining them. For, first, the fact is manifestly false, particularly as to Lisle and some others. Secondly, the States, after a peace, are to have four hundred thousand crowns a year out of the remainder of Flanders, which is then to be left to Spain. And lastly, suppose all these acquired dominions will not bring a penny into their treasury, what can be of greater consequence, than to be able to maintain a mighty army out of their new conquests, which, before, they always did by taxing their natural subjects?
How shall we be able to answer it to king Charles III, that while we pretend to endeavour restoring him to the entire monarchy of Spain, we join at the same time with the Dutch to deprive him of his natural right to the Low-countries?
But suppose, by a Dutch barrier, must now be understood only what is to be in possession of the
