kingdoms in Europe. So that mercenary forces in a free state, whether monarchy or commonwealth, seem only necessary either for preserving their conquests, (which in such governments it is not prudent to extend too far) or else for maintaining war at a distance.
In this last, which at present is our most important case, there are certain maxims, that all wise governments have observed.
The first I shall mention is, that no private man should have a commission to be general for life, let his merit and services be ever so great; or, if a prince be unadvisedly brought to offer such a commission in one hand, let him (to save time and blood) deliver up his crown with the other. The Romans, in the height and perfection of their government, usually sent out one of the new consuls to be general against their most formidable enemy, and recalled the old one; who often returned before the next election, and according as he had merit, was sent to command in some other part; which perhaps was continued to him for a second, and sometimes a third year. But if Paulus Æmilius, or Scipio himself, had presumed to move the senate to continue their commission for life, they would certainly have fallen a sacrifice to the jealousy of the people. Cæsar indeed (between whom and a certain general, some of late, with much discretion have made a parallel) had his command in Gaul continued to him for five years; and was afterwards made perpetual dictator, that is to say, general for life; which gave him the power and the will of utterly destroying the Roman liberty. But in his time the Romans were very much degenerated, and great corruptions had crept into their morals and discipline. However, we see there still
