traordinary favour, or the consequences of it, I am sure it is the strongest mark of our confidence in France, and such a one, as I believe they would not place in us, upon any occasion. I will illustrate this by a parallel case.
The French protestants who fled over hither from a persecution on account of religion, never discovered any principles which were incompatible with the civil government of France, nor ever set up any pretender to the present royal family of that kingdom; and yet, if we should think fit to form any considerable number of them into complete distinct regiments, to be composed of French protestants only, and commanded by French officers, without any incorporation of British soldiers, I fancy it would give our good allies some umbrage. But I am almost confident, that they would never permit us to send over a protestant French officer from every regiment to recruit their respective corps, by dispersing themselves into those provinces where they have the best interest; or suffer a field officer, in English pay, to reside constantly in Paris, and exercise a sort of martial law in the capital of their dominions; I say, they would hardly suffer this, even though our ambassador should solicit such an order, with the utmost application, for twenty years together.
And yet the case of the Irish forces is much stronger with respect to us. They do not differ with us only in matters of religion, but hold principles absolutely destructive of our civil government; and are generally looked upon abroad as a standing army, kept on foot to serve the pretender upon any occasion.
