The Legislature Knew What It Meant.
Do you suppose, your honor, that the legislature intended to open the doors to an unending and everlasting argument about whether there is a conflict? Did they have such a thought in mind? How could they? How could the legislature of this state, a body of such splendid men, as we had there last year—how could they design such a thought—how could they hope to place upon the people of this commonwealth such a dangerous law?
They did not have that in mind. How do we know? The act says they did not. They had no thought that the doors would be opened to religious argument and that men would be brought upon the witness stand to testify as to their opinion whether there was a conflict or not a conflict. They determined themselves, this question: Whether there was a conflict between the story of divine creation and the theory that man came from a lower order of animal—monkey, rat, or what not. They say so. And therefore you stand here in the face of this act and undertake to put this on.
Some of the authorities I have cited, your honor, I would like to read to show you how strong the courts make this.
First—A statute should never be given an absurd construction, but must always be construed, if possible, so as to make then effective and carry out the purposes for which they are enacted. The legislative intent will prevail over the literal or strict language used. And, in order to carry into effect this intent, general terms will be limited and those that are narrow expanded.
How much stronger could they make it? General terms will be limited and those that are narrow will be expanded. How eager are the courts that the act shall be construed so as to carry out the intention of the legislature into the court? That is 117 Tennessee, 381 and 134 Tennessee 577.
"Uncertainty of sense does not alone spring from uncertainty of expression. It is always presumed, in regard to a statute, that no absurd or unreasonable result was intended by the legislature. Hence, if viewing a statute from the standpoint of the literal sense of its language it is unreasonable or absurd and obscurity of meaning exists, calling for judicial construction, we must, in that event look to the act as a whole, to the subject with which it deals, to the reason and spirit of the enactment, and thereby, if possible, discover its real purposes; if such purposes can reasonably be said to be within the scope of the language used, it must be taken to be a part of the law, the same as if it were expressed by the literal sense of the words used. In that way while courts do not and cannot bend words, properly, out of their reasonable meaning to effect a legislative purpose, they do give to words a strict or liberal interpretation within the bounds of reason, sacrificing literal sense and rejecting interpretation not in harmony with the evident intent of the lawmakers rather than that such intent should fail."—134 Tennessee, 577."
Another excerpt from the same case. "In construing a statute the meaning is to be determined, not from special words in a single sentence or section but from the act taken as a whole, comparing one section with another and viewing the legislation in the light of its general purpose.—134 Tennessee, 612"
What was the general purpose of the legislature here? It was to prevent teaching in the public schools of any county in Tennessee that theory which says that man is descended from a lower order of animals. That is the intent and nobody can dispute it under the shining sun of this day. That was the purpose of it. Because it denies the story of the divine creation of the Bible. That is the intent, and to bring men, mere men here, made of mud and clay, common mud and clay, to say, that God's word is not contravened by this act. Your honor, there would never be an end to such inquiry as that, there would never be an end, because American citizens to the extent of 100,000,000
