LECTURE III
THE INDEPENDENT BEINGS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF REALISM
In the foregoing lecture, after naming four historical conceptions of Being, we undertook an exposition and comparison of two of these four conceptions. We indicated the general attitude towards life and towards the universe which is assumed on the one hand by Realism, on the other hand by Mysticism. Before proceeding with our list of the historical conceptions of what it is to be real, we may well pause to examine still further these two; both as to their inner consistency, and as to their adequacy to their task of expressing the problems which beset our finite thought.
The present lecture I shall devote to a critical study of the realistic conception of what it is to be. The next lecture will similarly be concerned with a study of Mysticism. Then only shall we be prepared to go still further in the effort to define true Being.
I
The realistic conception of Being is, as we saw, extremely familiar in metaphysical doctrine. It has won no small favor in popular discussion. It is the typical notion of socially respectable conservatism, whenever such conservatism begins to use the speech of technical philosophy.
