one being we long since found to be impossible. For our
present point of view, however, the realistic difficulty of
the Many and the One has been wholly set aside. It is
not indeed for us a question of how the many things
could become one thing. For us the unity of the world
is the unity of consciousness. The variety of the world
is the internal, but none the less wealthy and genuine,
variety of the purposes and embodiments of purpose
present within this unity of the one divine consciousness.
Now with regard to the ultimate unity and consequent
harmony of all this variety, our Fourth Conception has
given us indeed a general formula. The Many must,
despite their variety, win harmony and perfection by their
cooperation. But this principle, so far, gives us no limit
either to the empirical variety of will, or of interest and
of experience in the absolute, nor any limit to the
relative independence which the uniqueness of the individual
elements makes possible. What we see, however, is that
every distinguishable portion of the divine life, in
addition to all the universal ties which link it to the whole,
expresses its own meaning. We see, too, that this
meaning is unique, and that this meaning is precisely identical
with what each one of us means by his own individual
will, so far as that will is at any time determinate, uniquely
selected, and empirically expressed. So much then for
the general relations of Absolute and of Finite will.
VI
Two expressions, familiar to common sense in speaking of finite will, receive herewith their sufficient and, I believe, their only possible justification. Common sense