Page:The World as Will and Idea - Schopenhauer, tr. Haldane and Kemp - Volume 2.djvu/367

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ON THE USE OF REASON AND STOICISM.
357

Similarly Arrian (iv. 1. 175): "Ου γαρ εκπληρωσει των επιθυμουμενων ελευθερια παρασκευαξεται, αλλα ανασκευῃ της επιθυμιας." (Non enim explendis desideriis libertas comparatur, sed tollenda upiditate.)

The collected quotations in the "Historia Philosophiæ Græco-Romanæ" of Hitter and Preller may be taken as proofs of what I have said, in the place referred to above, about the ὁμολογουμενως ξῃν of the Stoics. Also the saying of Seneca (Ep. 31, and again Ep. 74): "Perfecta virtus est æqualitas et tenor vitæ per omnia consonans sibi." The following passage of Seneca's indicates the spirit of the Stoa generally (Ep. 92): "Quid est beata vita? Securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. Hanc dabit animi magnitude, dabit constantia bene judicati tenax." A systematical study of the Stoics will convince every one that the end of their ethics, like that of the ethics of Cynicism from which they sprang, is really nothing else than a life as free as possible from pain, and therefore as happy as possible. Whence it follows that the Stoical morality is only a special form of Eudæmonism. It has not, like the Indian, the Christian, and even the Platonic ethics, a metaphysical tendency, a transcendental end, but a completely immanent end, attainable in this life; the steadfast serenity (αταραξια) and unclouded happiness of the wise man, whom nothing can disturb. Yet it cannot be denied that the later Stoics, especially Arrian, sometimes lose sight of this end, and show a really ascetic tendency, which is to be attributed to the Christian and Oriental spirit in general which was then already spreading. If we consider closely and seriously the goal of Stoicism, that αταραξια, we find in it merely a hardening and insensibility to the blow of fate which a man attains to because he keeps ever present to his mind the shortness of life, the emptiness of pleasure, the instability of happiness, and has also discerned that the difference between happiness and unhappiness is very much less than our anticipation of both is wont to represent. But this is