Page:The World as Will and Idea - Schopenhauer, tr. Haldane and Kemp - Volume 2.djvu/469

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ON THE WILL IN SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.
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A true feeling of the real relation between will, intellect, and life is also expressed in the Latin language. The intellect is mens, (Symbol missingGreek characters); the will again is animus, which comes from anima, and this from (Symbol missingGreek characters). Anima is the life itself, the breath, (Symbol missingGreek characters); but animus is the living principle, and also the will, the subject of inclinations, intentions, passions, emotions; hence also est mihi animus, – fert animus, – for "I have a desire to," also animi causa, &c.; it is the Greek (Symbol missingGreek characters), the German "Gemüth," thus the heart but not the head. Animi perturbatio is an emotion; mentis perturbatio would signify insanity. The predicate immortalis is attributed to animus, not to mens. All this is the rule gathered from the great majority of passages; though in the case of conceptions so nearly related it cannot but be that the words are sometimes interchanged. Under (Symbol missingGreek characters) the Greeks appear primarily and originally to have understood the vital force, the living principle, whereby at once arose the dim sense that it must be something metaphysical, which consequently would not be reached by death. Among other proofs of this are the investigations of the relation between (Symbol missingGreek characters) and (Symbol missingGreek characters) preserved by Stobæus (Ecl., Lib. i. c. 51, § 7, 8).

10. Upon what depends the identity of the person? Not upon the matter of the body; it is different after a few years. Not upon its form, which changes as a whole and in all its parts; all but the expression of the glance, by which, therefore, we still know a man even after many years; which proves that in spite of all changes time produces in him something in him remains quite untouched by it. It is just this by which we recognise him even after the longest intervals of time, and find the former man entire. It is the same with ourselves, for, however old we become, we yet feel within that we are entirely the same as we were when we were young, nay, when we were still children. This, which unaltered always remains quite the same, and does not grow old along with us, is really the