Page:The World as Will and Idea - Schopenhauer, tr. Haldane and Kemp - Volume 3.djvu/110

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SECOND BOOK. CHAPTER XXVI.

I have satisfied the maxim: Est enim verum index sui et falsi. But Spinoza did not know how else to help himself but by the desperate stroke of denying teleology itself, thus design in the works of nature – an assertion the monstrosity of which is at once evident to every one who has gained any accurate knowledge of organised nature. This limited point of view of Spinoza, together with his complete ignorance of nature, sufficiently prove his entire incompetence in this matter, and the folly of those who, upon his authority, believe they must judge contemptuously of final causes.

Aristotle, who just here shows his brilliant side, contrasts very advantageously with these modern philosophers. He goes unprejudiced to nature, knows of no physico-theology such a thing has never entered his mind, – and he has never looked at the world for the purpose of seeing whether it was a bungled piece of work. He is in his heart pure from all this, for he also sets up hypotheses as to the origin of animals and men (De generat. anim., iii. 11) without lighting upon the physico-theological train of thought. He always says: "(Symbol missingGreek characters)" (natura facta est). But after he has truly and diligently studied nature, he finds that it everywhere proceeds teleologically, and he says: "(Symbol missingGreek characters)" (naturam nihil frustra facere cernimus), De respir., c. 10; and in the books, De partibus animalium., which are a comparative anatomy: "(Symbol missingGreek characters)" (Nihil supervacaneum, nihil frustra natura facit. – Natura rei alicujus gratia facit omnia. – Rem autem hanc esse illius gratia asserere ubique solemus, quoties finem intelligimus aliquem, in quern motus terminetur; quocirca ejusmodi aliquid esse constat, quod Naturam vocamus. Est enim corpus instrumentum: nam membrum unumquod-