thousand of them are stated to have been slain, while the wounded totalled a still larger amount. Having by such results proved his forecast that victory would incline to his side, Belisarius condescended to explain to his staff why he had expressed himself so confidently at the beginning of the siege. The Byzantine army, he pointed out, was composed almost entirely of skilful horse-archers, especially the Huns, whilst the Gothic cavalry were provided only with swords and spears, being, moreover, without protective armour. Hence, they were powerless except in a hand-to-hand fight; but in conflict with his mounted bowmen most of them were brought down before they could come to close quarters. Such was his demonstration, but nevertheless, as weeks rolled over, the Roman general found that his position was becoming precarious owing to the diminutive size of his army and the immense host which they had to resist. The Goths also, taught by experience, ceased to attack the walls in a densely packed throng, a proceeding which was the prime cause of their being repulsed with such huge slaughter, since every missile aimed at them told with deadly effect. He began to fear, therefore, that in the end his task might prove to be greater than he could cope with, and set about devising expedients to lighten the situation. In one way the besieged were not so hard pressed as might have been anticipated; owing to the extensive circuit of the walls, even the very numerous forces of the Goths were unable to maintain a strict blockade. Thus communication with the outside world, though not devoid of risk, was still facile. Belisarius now forwarded an earnest entreaty to Justinian, praying for reinforcements, and representing that the hardships endured by the Romans might induce a renewal of their allegiance to the Goths. He also determined to empty the city of all
