around Martyropolis. Buzes and Bessas commanded the garrison of the town, but without confidence in their powers of resistance to the assault; for not only were the walls easily surmountable in many places, but the beleaguered were ill supplied with sustenance, and with warlike machines to repel the assaults of the enemy.[1] Nor had the Byzantines any troops in the field with whom they could hope to raise the siege; and Sittas, though posted at only one day's march from the scene of hostilities, feared to approach nearer with the slender army at his disposal.[2] From time to time successful sallies were made by the besieged, and Bessas, who was a bold cavalry leader, now, as on former occasions, found opportunities of inflicting considerable loss on the foe; but nevertheless it was felt that a crisis disastrous to the Romans could not long be delayed.[3] In this impass a stratagem was concerted and carried out effectively, which blunted the ardour of the siege and eventually saved the town. As in all ages, it was the practice to maintain spies in an enemy's camp; and between both nations there was a habitual interchange of renegades who were anxious to betray the secrets of their country, attracted by the substantial rewards which generally accrued to such treason. A man of this class was now at hand, one whose reliability had been tested by the Emperor himself, and he
- ↑ Procopius, loc. cit., 21. It should be noted that P. is not now relating his own experiences, as he returned to Constantinople with Belisarius.
- ↑ Ibid. He was at Attachae, not far from Amida; cf. Zachariah Myt., loc. cit., 6.
- ↑ The exploits of Bessas are dwelt on by Zachariah Myt., loc. cit., 5 et seq. Most details of the siege are given by Malala (p. 468 et seq.), which, however, I omit here as we shall have more interesting opportunities later on of studying the mode of procedure at sieges in this age.
