Page:The copyright act, 1911, annotated.djvu/22

§1 (1)
EXISTING LAW.

Publication of a literary or artistic work in this connexion means communication to the public in general either orally or by means of exhibition, circulation of copies, or otherwise^[1]. The following acts of communication are, for instance, not deemed to be a publication so as to divest the common law right: (i) private or business letters sent to a correspondent or shown to friends or other interested persons^[2]); (ii) a manuscript or artistic work delivered or exhibited to a friend for his personal perusal or view, or to a publisher or other person or persons with a view to obtaining his or their opinion, or arranging for the publication or sale of the work^[3]; (iii) a book or artistic work printed or otherwise multiplied and distributed among a limited class, such as friends of the author or members of a society^[4]; (iv) a work of art exhibited in a place to which the public are admitted only upon payment and subject to rules prohibiting, inter alia, the making of any sketches or copies of the picture^[5]; (v) a dramatic or musical work performed in a theatre or other place to which the public are admitted for payment on the implied understanding that they are admitted solely for their entertainment and amusement^[6]; (vi) a lecture delivered to a class of students in a university, or to any other limited class of the public, or in a place to which the public are admitted for payment, in each case upon the implied understanding that the lecture is delivered solely for the instruction of those present^[7].

Meaning of "author." The author of a work is the person from whom emanates the general conception and design. Where, in order to achieve the final result, the author employ's other persons to prepare detailed portions, which will ultimately be worked into the main design, the work of the persons executing the details, under the instruction of the author, merges in the final work, and all becomes the property of the author as the principal designer^[8]. The mere suggestion, however, of a subject or idea which is then entirely designed and executed by another does not con-

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1. Caird v. Sime (1887). 12 A. C. 32G; Macmillan v. Dent, [1907] 1 Ch. 107; Jewellers v. Jewellers (1895), 84 Hun. 12.
2. Pope v. Carl (1741), 2 Atk. 342.
3. Caird v. Sims (1887), 12 A. C. 326. See, however, Blank v. Footman (1888), 39 Ch. D. 678; Southey v. Sherwood (1817), 2 Mer. 435.
4. Prince Albert v. Strange (1849). 2 De G. & Sm. 652; Kenrick v. Danube Collieries (1891), 39 W. R. 473; Exchange Telegraph v. Central News, [1897] 2 Ch. 48.
5. Werckmeister v. American Lithograph Co. (1904), 134 Fed. Rep. 321; Turner v. Robinson (1860), 10 Ir. Ch. 121, 510.
6. Macklin v. Richardson (1770) Amb. 694; D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835), 1 Y. & C, Ex. 288.
7. Abernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 209; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Nicols v. Pitman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 374.
8. Scott v. Stanford (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 718: Barfield v. Nicholson (1824), 2 Sim. & Stu. 1; Hatton v. Kean (1859), 7 C. B. (N. S.) 268; Wallerstein v. Herbert (1867), L. T. 453.