Page:The empire and the century.djvu/704

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OUR POLICY
661

paign so far removed from our own frontier as Afghan Turkestan. We could, however, and we should, give the Afghans all the support possible south of African Turkestan—such, for instance, as the services of British officers supplementary to those appointed as instructors; and even a contingent of native troops specially trained in mountain warfare, such as the Gurkhas, to form and hold strong positions of defence in the Hindu Kush, and to harass and worry the line of advance on the side of Herat. An advance in force on our part to Kandahar and Jalalabad (the latter place is the most important strategical position on the Khyber route to Kabul, for it dominates more than one route Indiawards) with railway communication completed to those important centres would also form part of the practical reply to Russia's movement forwards. No such reply on our part would be resented in Afghanistan. On the contrary, if we were to sit still and do nothing, we should run the risk of rousing the fiercest indignation amongst the warlike races of that country. Knowing something of the temper of the Afghan people, both in the east and west, I have no doubt about the necessity of such preliminary action. Whether we should advance in force further than Kandahar or Jalalabad, as Russian movements developed, would depend on so many variable factors in the situation that it would be absurd to offer a decided opinion. We should certainly assist in repelling any attempt to cross the Hindu Kush, if such an attempt were obviously serious; and we might find much better positions beyond Kandahar than are offered by that fortress for delaying, or finally staying, advance on that side. On the whole, I am inclined to think that we should have to move in force, and that we should find little difficulty in doing so. If British officers are to be associated with Afghan troops in future, it is obvious that they cannot be withdrawn at the time when they are most needed. The damage done to our prestige by recall would be too serious to contemplate; and if our officers were involved in an