thing at the far-off headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, but, while putting him at the head of the whole army, to delegate responsibility to high and powerful commanders of the forces. In fact, to make the chief command one over four armies, call them what you will, instead of having independent local armies, and in the case of Bengal dangerously overgrown and amalgamated.
The statesmen and soldiers who supported this 'reorganization,' with long experience of India and the character of the people, were fortified by every incident in the military history of India, in their desire to preserve the country from the dangers of an immense amalgamated army. They felt, too, that from these four or five commands (for Burma was to be separate as at present) would spring the field army in due proportions, which could be mobilized more easily from these areas, each with its own military resources, than from a huge military force, unified and governed by a central power. The native soldier does not enlist from any sentiment or patriotic feeling; he may come from a fighting stock, but he passes under our standards because soldiering is a good trade, and his pay and pension are assured. The reorganization of 1895 made for safety and mobility. The men were not disturbed; the Sikh knew he would be for the most part within hail of his home and under Generals, great and lesser, who would identify themselves with him and his country. And so it was with the others.
The first step in the abandonment of the principles which had held the field for so long was made in 1908. The regiments of cavalry and battalions of infantry were re-numbered and re-named, so as to get rid of all territorial connection. The object aimed at was to have one army in India, and not four bodies in one army—a complete reversal of the older policy. The next step was to abolish the Southern or Madras Command, and practically the Madras army, substituting regiments recruited from northern races for the Madras
