consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the agent never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are in his power and deliberation therefore is useless; consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
P. 54, l. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, i. 10, ἕστιδ' ἡ μὲν βούλησιτ ἀγαθοῦ ὅρεξις (οὐδεις γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἣ ὅταν οἰηθῆ εῖναι ἀγαθόν).
P. 56, l. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered: so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour, which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy. First Part, chap. ii.
P. 58, l. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances, we can only choose how we will act, not what circumstances we will have to act under.
P. 59, l. 19. “Moral Courage” is our phrase.
P. 61, l. 6.
The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.
"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form; Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage, i.e. Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour.
P. 62, l. 14. For true Courage is required, 1. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.
P. 63, l. 11. This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion. The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
P. 63, l. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας).
P. 63, l. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata ub vanos tumultus gens.
P. 64, l. 5. In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Bœotian troops, the πολιτικὰ Coroneans.
