Page:The ethics of Aristotle.djvu/307

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279


other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the ἀκρατὴς—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

P. 132, l. 9. See the note on Άρχὴ on page 4, l. 30.

P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself (ἁπλῶς), or for the sake of something further (ἕνεκά τινος). If the first, then either syllogistically (ἐπιστήμη), non-syllogistically (νοῦς), or by union of the two methods (σοφία). If the second, either with a view to act (φρόνησις), or with a view to make (τέχνη).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles (νοῦς), Deductions (ἐπιστήμη), or Mixed (σοφία). If Contingent, Action (φρόνησις), Production (τέχνη). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell's notes.)

P. 133. l. 20. The cobbler is at his last; why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of some one: and the price to be paid, i.e. the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.

P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of ὄρεξις before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice: Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be: if this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς.
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ. See Bishop Butler's Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.

P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post. Analytics.

P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle (i.e. proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. I.) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by νοῦς, in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich's instance.