Page:The ethics of Aristotle.djvu/312

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284
Aristotle's Ethics


P. 142, l. 34. The relative οὖ might be referred to τὸ σύμφερον, but that εὐβουλία has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that πρός τι τέλος as opposed to that πρός τὸ τέλος ἁπλῶς.

P. 143, l. 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with συγγνώμη.

P. 144, l. 1. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. φρόνησις is equivalent to εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, γνώμη, and νοῦς (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is φρόνησις, i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the φρόνιμος forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then εὔβουλος—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is συνετὸς—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits γνώμη to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising νοῦς πρακτικὸς or αἴσθησις—while in each and all he is φρόνιμος.

P. 144, l. 7. See note, on p. 140.

P. 144, l. 19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of αἴσθησις. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of νοῦς, i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.

P. 144, l. 25. i.e. of the συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν.

P. 144, l. 27. See the note on Άρχὴ on p. 4, l. 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practical Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (i.e. by ἐθισμός).

    All that is pleasant is to be done.
    This is pleasant,
.·. This is to be done.

By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss. i.e. on the suggestions of ἐπιθυμία, a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss; Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς. And his analysis of ἀκρασία. (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to ἐπιθυμία suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.