appear, who with skillful hand can effect those corrections which a change of fashion or the ignorance of authors may have made necessary; but if he is properly qualified for his task, he will do all this without a departure from any of the great principles of Universal Grammar. He will surely be very far from thinking, with a certain modern author, whom I shall notice in an other chapter, that, "He is bound to take words and explain them as he finds them in his day, without any regard to their ancient construction and application."—Kirkham's Gram., p. 28. The whole history of every word, so far as he can ascertain it, will be the view under which he will judge of what is right or wrong in the language which he teaches. Etymology is neither the whole of this view, nor yet to be excluded from it. I concur not therefore with Dr. Campbell, who, to make out a strong case, extravagantly says, "It is never from an attention to etymology, which would frequently mislead us, but from custom, the only infallible guide in this matter, that the meanings of words in present use must be learnt."—Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 188. Jamieson too, with an implicitness little to be commended, takes this passage from Campbell; and, with no other change than that of "learnt" to "learned" publishes it as a corollary of his own.—Grammar of Rhetoric, p. 42. It is folly to state for truth what is so obviously wrong. Etymology and custom are seldom at odds; and where they are so, the latter can hardly be deemed infallible.
CHAPTER II.
OF GRAMMATICAL AUTHORSHIP.
"Respondeo, dupliciter aliquem dici grammaticum, arte et professione. Grammatici vera arte paucissimi sunt: et hi magna laude digni sunt, ut patuit: hos non vituperant summi viri; quia ipse Plinius ejusmodi grammaticus fuit, et de arte grammatica libelos edidit. Et Grellius veræ grammaticæ fuit diligentissimus doctor; sic et ipse Datus. Alii sunt grammatici professione, et ii plerumque sunt inceptissimi; quia scribimus indocti doctique, et indignissimus quisque hanc sibi artem vindicat:—--hos mastigias multis probris docti summo jure insectantur."—DESPAUTER. Syntaxis, fol. 1.
1. It is of primary importance in all discussions and expositions of doctrines, of any sort, to ascertain well the principles upon which our reasonings are to be founded, and to see that they be such as are immovably established in the nature of things; for error in first principles is fundamental, and he who builds upon an uncertain foundation, incurs at least a hazard of seeing his edifice overthrown. The lover of truth will be, at all times, diligent to seek it, firm to adhere to it, willing to submit to it, and ready to promote it; but even the truth may be urged unseasonably, and important facts are things liable to be misjoined. It is proper, therefore, for every grammarian gravely to consider, whether and how far the principles of his philosophy, his politics, his morals, or his religion, ought to influence, or actually do influence, his theory of language, and his practical instructions respecting the right use of words. In practice, grammar is so interwoven with all else that is known, believed, learned, or spoken of among men, that to determine its own peculiar principles with due distinctness, seems to be one of the most difficult points of a grammarian's duty.
2. From misapprehension, narrowness of conception, or improper bias, in relation to this point, many authors have started wrong; denounced others with intemperate zeal; departed themselves from sound doctrine; and produced books which are disgraced not merely by occasional oversights, but by central and radical errors. Hence, too, have sprung up, in the name of grammar, many unprofitable discussions, and whimsical systems of teaching, calculated rather to embarrass than to inform the student. Mere collisions of opinion, conducted without any acknowledged standard to guide the judgement, never tend to real improvement. Grammar is unquestionably a branch of that universal philosophy by which the thoroughly
