The Memorandum then points out that Russia had
declared she wished to mobilize. Austria would thus
be forced to mobilize, not only against Serbia but also
against Russia. An encounter between the two thus
became inevitable.
“This, however, is the casus fœderis for Germany. Only a miracle can now prevent war.
“Germany does not wish to bring about this terrible war. But the German Government knows that it would be fatally violating the deep-rooted feelings of fidelity to the alliance, one of the finest traits of German sentiment, and placing itself in opposition to all the feelings of its people, if it were not willing to come to the help of their ally at a moment which might be decisive for the latter's existence.”
Germany, therefore, does not want to “bring about this terrible war,” but “one of the finest traits of German sentiment,” which the General Staff so brilliantly represented, forces it to do so namely, fidelity to the conspiracy of July 5th, which is also “one of the finest traits of German sentiment.”
After this appeal to German sentiment, however, the General Staff becomes quite unsentimental:
“According to the reports to hand, France also appears to be taking preparatory measures for eventual mobilization. It is obvious that Russia and France are going hand in hand with their measures.
“If the conflict between Russia and Austria is inevitable, Germany will therefore mobilize, and
be prepared to enter into a war on two fronts.
