In the face of this situation, what position did the
German Government take up? Up to the present,
no clear answer to this question could have been given.
Did it allow itself to be dragged in tow by Austria
without knowing exactly where it was going, or did it act with
Austria willingly, energetically, and in full
consciousness of what was afoot?
We find that its attitude in regard to Austrian policy in the Balkans was profoundly altered by the outrage at Serajevo.
When, in 1913, Rumania entered upon the second Balkan war in league with Serbia, the Hohenzollern Carol of Rumania had the Hohenzollern William of Germany covering his rear against the Habsburg. On that occasion Berlin was urging Vienna to hold back.
Thus, on July and, 1914, Berchtold remarked to Tschirschky:
“When Rumania, without reference to us, and, as she well knew, against our interests, leagued herself with Serbia and fell upon the defenceless Bulgaria, Germany protected Rumania, and gave us to understand that we were not to move.” (Red Book, 1919, p. 19.)
But after Serajevo, the wrath of Austria was not directed against Rumania and Serbia combined; it was wholly concentrated on the latter. And the Serbian Government, Monarchy as it was, now figured in William's eyes as the abettor and originator of regicide. His dynastic feeling, which had saved Rumania from Austria, now urged Austria as strongly against Serbia. Did he not abandon the projected visit of condolence to Vienna on July 2nd because
