��was another "note ", but righteous indignation throughout the country from this time on began to rapidly crystalHze. On February 3, 1917, diplomatic relations with Germany w^ere severed. And, on April the 6th, 1 9 1 7 — April
the month of the Battle of Lexington which precipitated the Revolution,
the month of Sumpter which pitted North against South, — the United States declared war against Germany.
Did w^e mobilize a million men overnight and rush them across the w^ater the following day to stop the gruesome carnage? Thanks to the British Navy, the foe, then at the height of his power on land, w^as prevented from invading our shore at a time when w^e should have been almost pow^erless to resist. The United States — a Samson shorn of his locks — had contracted for a battle with a powerful giant, fit, and shall we say victorious? What was to be done?
A tremendous army was needed. The assembling of a large number of men w^as not in itself the most difficult task; but once assembled, w^here was the material with w^hich they were to train and where would be the officers to train them? The German nation appreciated this problem more than we our- selves. General Hindenburg stated w^hen we entered the war that it was impossible for America to organize an army because of the lack of officers capable of operating in a battle area. Germany at the time treated our entry into the conflict as trivial, because she hoped to victoriously terminate the w^ar before w^e could produce an effective military machine.
But the lack of preparation in this country w^as due to ignorance — not to lack of patriotism. Once in the war the Nation w^as in it heart and soul. We had failed to prepare for the test, but it w^as still not too late. Teuton logic w^as scheduled for one of its premier jolts.
While Congress w^as striving to thrash out the vexing question of how to raise an army, the War Department was authorized to launch at once its plan for laying the foundation for that army. Little did it matter at that time to the army officials as to w^hether recruits w^ere to be secured by voluntary enlist- ment or draft. They knew^ that one million men w^ere needed at the earliest possible moment and that before those men w^ere called, there must be officers to train and lead them.
The United States, for military purposes, was divided into sixteen sec- tions, each section containing approximately the same population, although obviously not an equal number of square miles. From each of these sections, the War Department w^as to pick 2,500 men — those apparently most prom- ising in mind and body of all applicants w^ho volunteered to take a course
of training designed to prepare them to become officers. For these sixteen sections there w^ere to be established, in appropriate sections of the country, fourteen training camps. Men from the first and second sections were to train
at the same camp Plattsburg. Men from the tenth and eleventh sections
w^ere also to train at a single camp — Fort Sheridan. This accounts for there being two less camps than sections.
The declaration of w^ar w^ith Germany did not bring a simultaneous an- nouncement of this plan, although the War Department must have been con-
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