Again, in the law of evidence, our writer prescribes: "Women should give evidence for women, twice-born men for the twice-born of the same kind, virtuous Shūdras for Shūdras, and men of the lowest caste for the lowest." He permits that on failure of a qualified witness evidence may be given by women and others. But here he warns that such evidence should be accepted with great consideration. In cases of violence, theft, adultery, and defamation the (eligibility of) witness should not be examined too strictly (viii, 68 ff). He admits the eligibility of all varnas as witnesses. He says truthful speakers from all varnas ought to be made witnesses (viii, 63), but in the next following verses exempts some persons from the duty of giving evidence and also denies the eligibility of giving evidence to some. But he mixes together people belonging to both the classes. He says: "The king cannot be made a witness, nor a workman (like a cook), nor dancers, nor Shrotriya, nor a student of Vedas, nor one (an ascetic) who has shaken off connection with the world."
"Nor one wholly dependent, nor one of bad fame, nor a Dasyu, nor one who follows forbidden occupations" (viii, 63 ff).
Regarding the appointment of the officers of justice our text lays down the rule, "But if the king does not personally investigate the suits let him appoint a learned Brāhmana to try them" (viii, 9).
It also recommends that the assessors should be Brāhmanas (viii, II). Moreover, it says: "A Brāhmana who subsists only by the name of his jäti, or one who merely calls himself a Brāhmana (though his origin be
