who enjoys a willing maiden shall not suffer that punishment if his caste be equal to hers" (viii, 364).
Here there are two elements to be considered in determining the magnitude of the crime — the status of the woman, and the force used. Our writer has not analyzed them.
He again says: "If a man of lower varna seeks a woman of the higher varna he deserves death. But if her caste be equal to his, then he should pay the father the price of the bride."
"But if a man through insolence forcibly contaminates a maiden, two fingers deserve to be instantly cut off and he shall pay a fine of six hundred panas."
"A man of equal varna who contaminates a willing maiden shall not suffer this amputation, but shall pay a fine of two hundred panas in order to deter him from the repetition of the offense" (viii, 366-8).
This carelessness of our writer is a very clear example of indefiniteness in this matter. We are not so much concerned with the details of punishment as with the principles. The indistinctness of the rules does not prevent us from knowing those principles. These rules explain to us clearly that the element of caste of the guilty man was considered in deciding cases of fornication and outrage of unmarried girls.
When the limits of varna were crossed the consent of the woman was of very little importance. When a man of low caste has intercourse with a woman of high caste, the matter, whether the intercourse was committed with her consent or against her will, became of very little significance. This spirit can be traced in the
