FIKLD OF THE ALMA. 343 It is easy to see how the idea of abandoning the chap, III western coast carried with it a prolongation of the 1— halt on the Alma. The number of the wounded was so great, that the labour of getting them on board could not but fill a good deal of time, and it was of necessity that this operation should be covered by the presence of a sullicient force. Now, if the Allies had been firmly persisting in their determination to march against the Sever- naya or north side of Sebastopol, the western coast would liave necessarily continued to be the theatre of operations, and in that case it would have been easy for them to go on with their ad- vance the very day after the battle, leaving only a detachment on the Alma to cover the embarka- tion of the wounded. If, on the other hand, the Allies should determine to abandon the western coast, they could not well venture to leave there an isolated detachment ; and the business of em- barking the wounded must either go on without the presence of any land forces to cover the opera- tion, or else the wliolo Allied ai-my would have to be detained lor the purpose ; and, since the aban- donment of the wounded by the land forces was an alternative too painful in its possible conse- quences to be held worthy of adoption,* it fol- lowed that to harbour the idea of giving up the
- With our present knowledge we may entertain no doubt
that the seamen and marines of the Allied navies might have been well able to secure the safe embarkation of the wounded without requiring the support of the land forces ; but, at the time, there was not information enough in the Allied camp to warrant such an assumption.
