Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 3.djvu/389

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PLAN OF ATTACKING THE NOKTH SIDE. 363 imity of that field of action to the roads which chap. converge near Mackenzie's Farm, the plan of '. operating against the north side of Sebastopol was compatible with measures for seizing the enemy's lines of communication* And this was a priceless advantage ; for although, in regard to material supplies, Sebastopol for the time might be sufficing to the needs of the Kussian army, Prince Mentschikoff was wholly dependent upon his lines of communication for the reinforcements which he believed to be of absolute necessity to him. General de Todleben has good means of knowing the degree of stress which must have been put upon the Russians by the loss of their lines of communication ; and it is his judgment that, at this time, the establishment of an Allied force on the road to Baktchi Serai must have brought the campaign to an end.-f- The forts, barracks, storehouses, and factory, The plateau . overhanging which thus came to be of great M'orth in the the North , ^ p Side. eyes of the strivmg nations, were at the foot of a high plateau surrounded on three sides by water. Along the northern boundary of the plateau there flowed the stream of the Belbec ; on the west, its base met the Black Sea ; and on the south, where the buildings were placed, it fronted the great bay of Sebastopol. The sea-forts were not so con- structed as to be the means of defence against an

  • Not oiilj' with the north, but with the south-east of the

Crimea, where there were 10,000 men under Khomatoff. t Expressed in liis book, and — very positively indeed— ia conversation with me.