100 EVASION OF MKNTSGHIKOFF AND HIS AHMV. the ncighl)ourliooJ of Otaikui ; and the next day, after leaving a detachment * in the cuuntvy of the Upper Belbec, lie yet further withdrew the main army, and comi)leted his retreat to the Katcha. There, day after day, as we shall see by- and-by more minutely, he remained with his army in a state of seclusion, concerting no measures ■with the people he had left in Sebastopol for the defence or relief of the place — nay, suflering tiie garrison to live on for a time in sheer ignorance of the region where he and his troops were repos- ing; and all this while, the Prince was so far iVoni tlireatening, or even obseiving, the invaders, tliat not only did he not know on which coast of the Crimea (the west or the south) they were operating, but when at last he once more ]nit liimself in communication with the garrison, it was to them that he looked lor his tidings, re- questing tiiem to send him back word and tell him ■where the enemy was. *!*
- A force of cavalry ami infantry under Jabrokritskj',
anioiintinf^ altor^ether to K',000 men. + It will be observed that, iu a summary form, this sontence contains a whole cluster of assertions, all having a bearing ui)on the qucjstion of Prince llentschikoff's competence for the com- mand of an army in the field. The proofs of these assertions will be given in the next chapter ; and there, also, there will be found an exposition of the way in whi(;h Prince MentschikofTs flank march has been justified.
