162 UKUOIO RESISTANCE OF SEBASTOPOL CHAP, general who adopted it, the aid of the army which ' he thus kept aloof M'oiild have failed to make good the defence against a determined attack. Where some 28,000 men stand tasked to defend a place to extremity, the desperate character of the service entrusted to them is, even at first sight, an astonishing reason to give for depriving them of the aid of a field army 30,000 strong, and with- drawing it from the scene of danger to a place of peaceful seclusion ; but a closer look makes the reason seem still more unfitting. Far from being one of those places in which a few brave defenders can do as well as many, Sebastopol was a fortress with miles of ground to be guarded, and the very thing needed for a hopeful defence of the place was the army which Prince Mentschikoff with- drew. It is true that from without, even better, perhaps, than from within, he might have l)rought the power of that army to bear upon the defence, but down to this time, he gave no aid to the garrison in cither one way or the other. It would be dilticult to excuse Prince IMcntschi- kofPs seclusion by alleging his want of supplies ; * l)ut although I am without the knowledge which # would warrant me in S})eaking with certainty, I can hazard a surmise which would account, in some measun;, lor the Prince's abstention. From the first, the Pussian army in the Crimea
- Because there was an accumulation of stores at Simpliero-
po). as well as at Sebastopol (Todleben, p. 148) ; and there did not occur any incident of war or of weather which could have frustrated the arrangcinents necpssnry for supplying tlio army.
